

УДК [341.238(477:438):341.983(438)]”2015/2023”

DOI <https://doi.org/10.33402/up.2025-19-09>

Liubomyr KHAKHULA

*Candidate of Historical Sciences, Senior Researcher,
Associate Professor at the Department of International Information
Lviv Polytechnic National University
ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9954-9962>
e-mail: l.khakhula@gmail.com*

Yurii MARKEVYCH

*Bachelor of International Relations
Master's Degree Candidate (Second Level) at the
Department of International Information
Lviv Polytechnic National University
ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0009-0005-0183-5522>
e-mail: yurii.markevych.mnmim.2023@lpnu.ua*

CONSERVATISM AS A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: POLITICAL PROCESSES IN THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND IN 2015–2023

The article analyzes political processes in the Republic of Poland during the rule of the “Law and Justice” party (PiS) in 2015–2023, when conservatism became the foundation of the state’s national security strategy. The conservative turn of the Polish political scene after the so-called “Tusk Era” and approaches to implementing right-conservative principles in domestic and foreign policy are examined. The electoral victories of PiS in 2015 and 2019, which secured the party parliamentary majority and presidential power, are analyzed. Special attention is given to five main postulates of the PiS program: state restoration, economic development, family policy, social reforms, and foreign policy subjectivity. It is shown that PiS’s conservative ideology was based on the values of freedom, solidarity, justice, national identity, and Catholic principles.

Key aspects of the political program of PiS included: the active social offer “500+”, strengthening the traditional family model, enhancing the role of the Catholic Church, judicial system reforms, and public administration reforms. PiS’s foreign policy course was characterized by Euroscepticism, strengthening cooperation with the USA and NATO, an anti-Russian position, and complex relations with Ukraine. Conservatism in Poland in 2015–2023 functioned as a comprehensive national security strategy that included protecting cultural authenticity, countering external influences, and strengthening internal unity. At the same time, contradictions existed between conservative principles and European integration, leading to external and internal political conflicts. The transition of executive power to the Civic Coalition and the formation of Donald Tusk’s government in 2023 did not end the conservative cycle in Polish politics, but initiated a new process of political confrontation between liberal-democratic and conservative-democratic doctrines. The Polish experience is of significant importance for understanding contemporary trends in European politics and Central European conservatism.

Keywords: Republic of Poland, conservatism, national security, “Law and Justice”, Civic Platform, international relations, political processes, Euroscepticism, Ukrainian-Polish relations.

The political scene of the Republic of Poland from the beginning of transformational processes in 1989 was a platform for representing diverse ideological views – Christian-democratic, social-democratic, liberal, conservative, ultra-nationalist. With the beginning of the XXI century, Poland's political landscape became dominated by two political forces that traced their genesis to oppositional anti-communist activities during the period of the Polish People's Republic. The post-Solidarity political parties "Civic Platform" (Platforma Obywatelska, PO) and "Law and Justice" (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) successfully competed for the sympathies of Poles for about a decade and a half. However, in 2015, a conservative turn occurred on the Polish political scene when the political faction "United Right" (Zjednoczona Prawica) united around PiS, obtained a parliamentary majority and their representative as president. Over the following eight years, Polish conservatives implemented their political principles in practice in domestic and foreign policy. In the public space, right-conservative views were represented as a component of Poland's national security and a guarantee for building a strong, solidary, equitable state.

In view of the outlined Polish political tendencies, the aim of the proposed article is to analyze the political process of the Republic of Poland during the period of power implementation by the "Law and Justice" Party in 2015–2023. Special attention is also given to the political views of the Polish right wing in the sphere of national security. It should be noted that the outlined problems were partially addressed by Polish and Ukrainian researchers (Szeptycki, 2023; Lytvyn, 2017; Lytvyn, 2021; Lytvyn, 2024; Khakhula, 2021). Their conclusions and generalizations became the foundation for an in-depth study of Polish conservative security strategy after 2015.

As early as May 2013, Poland published the "White Book of National Security of the Republic of Poland", which contained the main principles for implementing Polish national security. The document stated: "Historical experience prove that Poland's geopolitical position between the West and the East was the most important strategic factor influencing the formation of Polish national identity and statehood, and determining the essence and character of national interests and strategic goals in the field of security" (Biała Księga Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, 2013). The historical experience of the Polish people allowed for the conclusion that "the survival of the Polish nation even during the period without possessing its own state was possible thanks to the cultivation of language, traditions, culture and art, which strengthened national identity" (Biała Księga Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, 2013).

In the context of Poland's national security, an important place was given to Russia's behavior, where it was argued that Russia's influence in the post-Soviet space had weakened. Instead, Russia continued to increase its influence in individual states that were in direct proximity to Poland – Belarus and to a certain extent Ukraine. Regarding Ukraine, the document stated that "The weakening of the pro-Western vector in Ukraine's foreign and security policy is the most important manifestation of this trend (Russia's influence). It is quite probable that for the next few decades Ukraine will remain in a buffer zone between the Union and Russia, maneuvering between both centers" (Biała Księga Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, 2013). At the same time, "of particular importance for Poland is the development of good neighborly strategic relations with Ukraine. An independent,

stable Ukraine open to cooperation is of key importance for stability in Central and Eastern Europe” (Biała Księga Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, 2013).

After the so-called liberal-democratic “Tusk Era” (2007–2014), the greatest electoral success was achieved by the “Law and Justice” part, which with the political slogan “Work, not promises” (Praca, a nie obietnice) achieved a double presidential-parliamentary victory in 2015.

The political party “Law and Justice” was founded by Polish politicians Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński in 2001 and quickly became one of Poland’s leading political forces. Already following the 2005 election results, PiS formed a coalition together with the parties “Self-Defense” and “League of Polish Families”. Over the following years, this political force either formed the government or was the largest opposition party. Four Polish prime ministers (Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, Jarosław Kaczyński, Beata Szydło, Mateusz Morawiecki) and two presidents (Lech Kaczyński and Andrzej Duda) came from the PiS party.

As early as the end of 2014, PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński agreed on the candidacy of Krakow lawyer Andrzej Duda to oppose the then-president from the “Civic Platform” Bronisław Komorowski in the upcoming presidential elections. The electoral campaign often moved to the media sphere, particularly the so-called “new media” – social networks. Polish media analysts noted the effective work of A. Duda’s team on the Twitter network – one tweet by Bronisław Komorowski on average generated 74 reactions, while Andrzej Duda’s – 3.700 (Duda, 2023).

At the beginning of 2015, candidate A. Duda allowed for the possibility of providing military assistance to Ukraine: “It must be remembered that in the case where there is some assistance that Poland could provide (to Ukraine), such a decision would have to be seriously considered. It would have to be carefully thought over”. Such statements were strongly criticized, including by his opponent – B. Komorowski, who, as the incumbent president, stated: “Polish soldiers in Ukraine – this is nonsense” (Prezydentski wybory u Polshchi: shcho zminytsia dlia Ukrainy?, 2015).

In the first round, which took place on May 10, 2015, A. Duda won with a small margin, receiving 34.76% of votes. B. Komorowski took second place with a result of 33.77%. A quite high result was shown by a representative of the right-wing environment, musician Paweł Kukiz, who with the slogan “You can do it, Poland!” received 20.8% of votes (Prezydentski wybory u Polshchi: shcho zminytsia dlia Ukrainy?, 2015). Already in the second round, A. Duda achieved victory with 8.630.627 (51.55%) voter votes. 8.112.311 (48.45%) Poles voted for B. Komorowski.

The victory in the elections of the PiS candidate strengthened the chances of Polish conservatives to win in the autumn parliamentary elections. In June 2015, J. Kaczyński announced that his party’s candidate for the post of future Prime Minister of Poland would be Mrs. Beata Szydło – the manager of A. Duda’s presidential campaign. It was quite symbolic that the PiS candidate was given the same bus that A. Duda had traveled with before the elections – the Dudabus became the Szydłobus.

Jarosław Kaczyński’s team chose the slogan “Good Change” during the elections, which was understood as “a multi-faceted change, opposed to the world of “old establishments” (Chyzhevskyi, 2016). For the October elections, PiS went in a coalition

together with the parties: Jarosław Gowin's "Poland Together"; Zbigniew Ziobro's "Solidary Poland"; Marek Jurek's "Right Wing of the Republic". For the governmental political force PO, the electoral campaign was complicated by the migration crisis – a large influx of refugees that began in the summer of 2015 through Turkey. Under EU pressure, Ewa Kopacz's government declared the acceptance of 7 thousand refugees from Syria and other Middle Eastern states in Poland. This was skillfully used by the leader of the conservative opposition – Beata Szydło.

Therefore, on October 25, 2015, PiS received 37.58% of voter votes and accordingly 235 seats in the Sejm. PiS achieved an undoubted victory in the parliamentary race, succeeding not only in the traditionalist eastern and southern lands, but also in many places in the west of the country. The scale of the victory, for the first time in the history of democratic Poland, gave PiS the opportunity to independently form a government (Chyzhevskiy, 2016).

Among the factors that influenced the high electoral support for PiS during the 2015 parliamentary elections, one should mention the attractive political slogans presented in five postulates.

1) *State restoration (repair)*: modernization and streamlining of state institutions, break with remnants of the Polish People's Republic, returning the state to citizens, correction of the structure and principles of functioning of the Council of Ministers, public administration reform, strengthening public safety, judicial system reform, strengthening the role of state control institutions, streamlining the legislative process.

2) *Economy and development*: bringing the Polish economy out of the middle-development trap, development of modern state intervention, reindustrialization of the Polish economy, introduction of the principle of sustainable development for the entire country, change of the tax system, preservation of the Polish currency (opposition to the introduction of the euro), nationalization of the banking sector, basing Polish energy on coal, reconstruction of the research base, reconstruction of the maritime economy, development of the housing sector, increasing state support for rural development, protection of Polish farmland, protection of state forests.

3) *Family*: development of family policy, creation of a Ministry of Family Policy, expansion of access to family benefits, free kindergartens, abolition of civil law contracts, significant increase in workers' wages, creation of a National Employment Program (1 200 000 new jobs for youth), strengthening protection of workers' rights (amendments to the Labor Code), improving labor market functioning, liquidation of the National Health Fund, increasing budget funds for feeding children.

4) *Society*: reform of the public sector, reform and development of public debates, reform of the education system (changes in educational and training curricula), development of national education, increasing funding for Polish science and culture, broad access to Polish national heritage, development of historical identity policy (development of the Institute of National Remembrance), modernization of public media.

5) *Poland in Europe and the world*: restoration of Poland's subjectivity in international politics and foreign security, introduction of a law on implementation state sovereignty (EU as an association of sovereign and independent states), clarification of the causes of the Smolensk catastrophe 2010, new law on diplomatic service, close cooper-

ation with the USA and NATO (building an anti-missile shield), increase of the Polish army, development of the Polish arms industry (Tyrała, 2016, s. 152–153).

As Polish expert Robert Czyżewski noted: “Jarosław Kaczyński’s party and sympathetic to it publicists criticized the previous Polish government for excessive subordination to Berlin, which together with Paris made a bet, in PiS’s opinion, on close cooperation with Moscow and therefore was not a sufficient guarantee against its aggressive policy. Views on foreign policy push PiS toward Ukraine, however, in domestic policy, Jarosław Kaczyński’s party must take into account the irritation of part of the electorate with Kyiv’s “Banderite” and thus “anti-Polish” historical policy (Tyrała, 2016, s. 152–153). In 2015–2017, the conservative government was headed by Beata Szydło, and from December 8, 2017, the position of Prime Minister passed to Mateusz Morawiecki, a representative of the banking sector (Panchenko, 2017).

PiS achieved its second consecutive victory in parliamentary elections in 2019, obtaining 235 deputies in the Sejm (43.8% of votes). At the same time, the “Civic Coalition” received only 134 mandates (27.2%), while the electoral coalition “The Left” got 49 (12.5% of votes). During the October elections, the “Polish Coalition” took 30 parliamentary seats (8.5%), and the «Confederation of Freedom and Independence» party got 11 (6.8%). Such a result (6% higher compared to 2015) allowed Polish conservatives to form a new government.

PiS support was traditionally linked to active social policy (the “500+” program and payment of 500 zloty for each child in large families) and nationally-oriented foreign policy (Kopynets, 2021). Second place was taken by a coalition called the “Civic Coalition”, which included the parties “Civic Platform”, “Modern” (Nowoczesna), and “The Greens”.

Table 1

Elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland from October 13, 2019

Party / Electoral Coalition	% of votes	Number of deputies	Ideology
Law and Justice (PiS, 2001)	43.5	235	National conservatism, pan-Catholicism, moderate Euroscepticism
Civic Coalition	27.4	134	Christian democracy, liberal conservatism, pro-Europeanism
The Left	12.5	49	Social democracy, pro-Europeanism
Polish Coalition	8.5	30	Christian democracy, pro-Europeanism
Confederation of Freedom and Independence (2019)	6.8	11	Polish nationalism, Euroscepticism
German National Minority	0.17	1	–

Source: Kopynets, Yu. (2021). Vplyv suchasnykh tendentsii rozvytku krain Yevropeiskoho Soiuzu na evoliutsiiu i funktsionuvannia partiinoi systemy Ukrainy: dys. ... k. polit. nauk: 23.00.02. Retrieved from: https://lnu.edu.ua/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/dis_kopynets.pdf (in Ukrainian).

In 2020, the next presidential elections took place, albeit under coronavirus pandemic conditions. The topic of Ukraine was already raised in pre-election debates. In particular, observers were surprised by the statement of the young candidate, Polish journalist Szymon Hołownia, that if elected President, he would make his first foreign visit to Kyiv (Hulai & Dmytryshyn, 2021, s. 268).

Among the 11 candidates, representatives of the two main parties advanced to the second round – Andrzej Duda and Rafał Trzaskowski. Therefore, on July 12, 2020, A. Duda defeated his liberal competitor with a margin of over 400 thousand Polish votes, or 51.21% to 48.79%. The incumbent President of the Republic of Poland gained an advantage in 7 eastern and southeastern voivodeships. R. Trzaskowski won in 9 central, northern, and western regions. Experts noted that “changing or preserving the current presidential power in Poland is unlikely to affect the current priorities of Polish foreign policy”. During the election campaign, A. Duda tried to reproach his opponent that in 2014, when Russia attacked Ukraine, his party “Civic Platform” was in power and could not ensure Poles’ sense of security. To this, the mayor of Warsaw replied that there are issues, such as the presence of American troops in Poland and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, which do not cause disagreements between the government and opposition, and President A. Duda should not have used them «for political games» (Kyrychenko, 2020).

As in previous years, the main values of the conservative political force PiS in 2019–2020 were – freedom, solidarity, equality, justice, community, nation, and the Commonwealth of freedom and equality (Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości, 2014). PiS particularly emphasized the need to strengthen national identity in society: “The nation, which we understand as a community of culture, language, historical experience, political tradition and civilizational values, as well as shared fate, is the broadest social group that constitutes an effective foundation for democratic political communities” (Postulaty Prawa i Sprawiedliwości. Analizujemy program oraz działania partii rządzącej, 2017). The Party also declared its devotion to Christian values. The teachings of the Catholic Church, in the opinion of its members, was an important source of moral principles. The party never supported the separation of church and state or the secularization of public life and recognized the authority of the church hierarchy.

For conservative ideologists of PiS, the family was understood as the basic social unit. The Party strongly promoted the so-called traditional family model: “We consider the family, which is based on lasting relationships between a woman and a man, as the basic structure of social life, in which particularly important human needs are satisfied. The family is irreplaceable – regardless of whether we look at it from a religious or secular point of view” (Postulaty Prawa i Sprawiedliwości. Analizujemy program oraz działania partii rządzącej, 2017).

The foreign policy of the PiS government was characterized by the aspiration for close cooperation between the countries of the Visegrad Group and building strong positions in the EU. There was strong distrust of Russia’s actions on the international arena within PiS. PiS’s anti-Russian rhetoric intensified after the Smolensk disaster in 2010.

In conditions of an unstable geopolitical situation, defense was an important aspect of state policy. PiS in its program already called for strengthening the army and basing Polish security on deeper cooperation with NATO: “The ability to defend territory must

be linked to strong allied guarantees within the framework of the Pact. Poland under the leadership of “Law and Justice” will strive to ensure the character of the North Atlantic Alliance as an organization whose main function is defense” (Postulaty Prawa i Sprawiedliwości. Analizujemy program oraz działania partii rządzącej, 2017). In relations with the EU, PiS called for fighting for a strong position for Poland in European structures and adopting the model of “Europe of Nations”. It openly opposed the imposition by Brussels of rules of conduct that contradict subjectively understood Polish interests.

Thus, the “Law and Justice” party was characterized by the greatest ideological eclecticism. It was described as conservative, Christian-democratic, social, Catholic-national, and independence-oriented. The PiS party, rejecting the excessive Eurocentrism of the previous government, in declarations and actions emphasized support for the EU as a community of sovereign member states, rather than European institutions. In contrast to the Europeanization of the country under Donald Tusk, Jarosław Kaczyński emphasized independence and sovereignty.

A significant political turn occurred in Poland in the autumn–winter of 2023, when following the results of parliamentary elections, the government was formed by the “Civic Platform” party and its coalition allies (Ostapets & Cherveniak, 2023, s. 19). Formed back in 2018, the “Civic Coalition” represented an alliance of the parties “Civic Platform”, “Modern”, “The Greens” and “Polish Initiative”, which were in open opposition to PiS and were expressed in the category: pro-European left-centrists and right-centrists. The “Civic Coalition” was headed by Poland’s Prime Minister in 2007–2014 and Chairman of the European Council in 2014–2019, Donald Tusk. The coalition’s ideology was directed toward nurturing liberal democratic values in Poland, and in foreign policy toward strengthening interaction with European institutions. The traditional electorate of the mentioned parties consisted of residents of large cities in the western and central parts of Poland (Davymuka, 2023).

In 2023, the opposition “Civic Coalition” spoke about the “Orbanization of Poland” by the “Law and Justice” party and promised to return the country to the European family. Regarding Ukraine, PiS used anti-Ukrainian rhetoric (“cessation of military aid”, “Ukraine should be grateful to Poland” etc.), while the “Civic Coalition” declared unconditional support for eastern neighbors.

On the eve of the elections, Polish public figure and journalist Szymon Hołownia managed to form a coalition called “Third Way”, which included the political movement “Poland 2050” and the “Polish People’s Party”. Positioning itself as an «alternative opposition political force of centrist liberal-democratic orientation», the “Third Way” demanded structural internal reforms, especially in the social sector, and defended a pro-European orientation (Davymuka, 2023).

On October 15, 2023, parliamentary elections were held in Poland for both chambers – the Sejm (lower house – 460 deputies) and the Senate (upper house – 100 senators). If the Senate was elected through voting in single-member districts, then the Sejm was voted for in 41 multi-member electoral districts using open party lists with a threshold of 5% of votes for political parties and 8% of votes for electoral coalitions (Romaniuk & Lytvyn, 2016).

With a record high voter turnout (73%), the right-centrist party PiS achieved a factual victory. In the Sejm, the conservatives received 35.4% of votes, the “Civic Coalition” – 30.7%, the “Third Way” – 14.4%, the left-wing party “New Left” – 8.6%; the right-wing alliance “Confederation of Freedom and Independence” – 7.2%. At the same time, in the Senate, PiS received 34,8%, the “Civic Coalition” – 28.9%, the “Third Way” – 11,5%, the “Confederation of Freedom and Independence” – 6.7%, the “New Left” – 5.3% (Ostapets & Cherveniak, 2023, s. 31; Davymuka, 2023).

Table 2

Elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland from October 15, 2023

Party/Electoral Coalition (year of establishment)	% of votes	Number of deputies (compared to 2015 elections)*	Party ideology
Law and Justice (2001)	35.4	194 (–41)*	National conservatism, moderate Euroscepticism
Civic Coalition (2018)	30.7	157 (+23)	Liberal conservatism, pro-Europeanism
“Third Way” Coalition (2023)	14.4	65 (+35)	Christian democracy, pro-Europeanism, green politics
“New Left” Party (2021)	8.6	26 (–23)	Social democracy, social liberalism
“Confederation of Freedom and Independence” Party (2019)	7.1	18 (+7)	Polish nationalism, Euroscepticism
German National Minority	0	0 (–1)	Protection of German national minority rights

Source: Ostapets, Yu. & Cherveniak, K. (2023). Parlamentski vybory 2023 roku v krainakh Yevropeiskoho Soiuzu: analiz rezultativ ta konfihuratsii uriadovykh koalitsii. In A. Romaniuk & V. Lytvyn (Eds.), Politychni partii i vybory: ukrainski ta svitovi praktyky: zb. st. i tez za rezultatamy Mizhnarodnoi naukovoï konferentsii «Instytutsiini, partiini ta vyborchi chynnyky politychnoho protsesu v Ukraini y inshykh krainakh Yevropy v umovakh viiny i nevyznachenosti: natsionalnyi, nadnatsionalnyi i subnatsionalnyi rivni» – vosmoi u ramkakh serii mizhnarodnykh konferentsii kafedry politolohii «Politychni partii i vybory: ukrainski ta svitovi praktyky» (pamiati Yuriiia Romanovycha Shvedy) vid 24–25 lystopada 2023 roku. Lviv: LNU im. Ivana Franka, 8, 13–42. Retrieved from: <https://dspace.uzhnu.edu.ua/jspui/handle/lib/63949> (in Ukrainian).

On December 13, 2023, D. Tusk headed the new post-election government. It included representatives of many parties and three main camps: the “Civic Coalition”, Szymon Hołownia’s “Poland 2050” party, the Polish People’s Party, and “The Left” (Katsevykh, 2023).

One of the important challenges for the new Polish government was the situation on the international arena. Russia’s war against Ukraine, structural challenges in the EU, changes in political elites in the USA, or global rivalry between the West and China added many tasks for Polish centrists and liberals. Analysts noted: “Given Poland’s long-standing leadership in lobbying for security interests and initiatives of

Central and Eastern European states, it is unlikely that the state will change its course regarding rapprochement with the USA and NATO to increase their presence in the region. One should not expect significant changes at the level of bilateral political dialogue between Poland and Ukraine either, despite existing contradictions regarding the export of Ukrainian grain. The Polish side, as before, remains one of Ukraine's closest partners, providing comprehensive assistance in countering the full-scale aggression of the Russian Federation, supporting the European and Euro-Atlantic course of the Ukrainian state and advocating for its national interests among the international community" (Davymuka, 2023).

The analysis of political processes in the Republic of Poland allows us to draw a number of conclusions regarding the place of national security in the political practice of Polish conservatives in the period 2015–2023. The conservative turn that began with the electoral victories of the "Law and Justice" party in 2015 not only changed political elites, but also transformed approaches to understanding national security. PiS conceptualized conservatism as a comprehensive strategy for protecting Polish statehood, which included preserving cultural authenticity, strengthening national identity, and countering external challenges. The ideological platform of PiS demonstrated a synthesis of traditional Catholic conservatism, economic interventionism, and geopolitical pragmatism. The PiS conservative governance model, consisting of five postulates of the party program – state restoration, economic development, family policy, social reforms, and foreign policy subjectivity – found broad electoral support among Polish citizens.

The foreign policy principles of PiS conservative governments were characterized by ambivalence: on one hand, deepening cooperation with the USA and NATO in the security sphere, on the other hand – growing tensions with European Union institutions over issues of rule of law and democratic standards. Relations with Ukraine during the period of PiS political power evolved from initial support to growing contradictions, especially in the context of historical memory and economic issues. This demonstrated the complexity of balancing between ideological principles and pragmatic considerations in foreign policy. Electoral fatigue from the polarization of society, economic challenges, and international pressure created conditions for political change in 2023, however, they did not mark the limits of the right-wing project in Poland.

Generally, Poland's experience from 2015–2023 demonstrates both the potential and limitations of using conservatism as a national security strategy. On one hand, conservative ideology can provide social mobilization, internal unity, and cultural stability. On the other hand, excessive polarization, conflicts with European partners, and institutional crises can undermine the long-term stability of the state. The Polish case is of significant importance for understanding contemporary trends in Central and Eastern Europe, where conservative parties seek to combine national sovereignty with European integration. The experience of PiS Party shows the necessity of finding a balance between preserving national identity and participating in supranational structures, which remains a relevant challenge for the entire region.

REFERENCES

- Chyzhevskiy, R. (2016). Zrozumity Polshchu. *Tyzhden*, 36. Retrieved from: <https://tyzhden.ua/zrozumity-polshchu/> (in Ukrainian).
- Davymuka, O. (2023). Parlamentski vybory v Polshchi 2023: pidsumky i perspektyvy polskoi zovnishnoi polityky. <https://niss.gov.ua/doslidzhennya/mizhnarodni-vidnosyny/parlamentski-vybory-v-polshchi-2023-pidsumky-i-perspektyvy> (in Ukrainian).
- Dudek, A. (2023). *Historia polityczna Polski. 1989–2023*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar (in Polish).
- Hulai, V. & Dmytryshyn, N. (2021). Prezydentska kampaniia 2020 roku v Respublitsi Polshcha. *Ukraina–Polshcha: istorychna spadshchyna i suspilna svidomist*, 14, 260–275. doi: 10.33402/up.2021-14-261-272 (in Ukrainian).
- Katsevych, M. (2023). Donald Tusk. Staryi holova novoho uriadu. *Nova Polshcha*. <https://novapolshcha.pl/article/donald-tusk-starii-golova-novogo-uryadu/> (in Ukrainian).
- Khakhula, L. (2021). Ukraina–Polshcha: vyklyky ta perspektyvy istorychnoi polityky pislia 2019 roku. *Ukraina–Polshcha: istorychna spadshchyna i suspilna svidomist*, 14, 248–259. doi: 10.33402/up.2021-14-249-260 (in Ukrainian).
- Kopynets, Yu. (2021). *Vplyv suchasnykh tendentsii rozvytku krain Yevropeiskoho Soiuzu na evoliutsiiu i funktsionuvannia partiinoi systemy Ukrainy*: dys. ... k. polit. nauk: 23.00.02. https://lnu.edu.ua/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/dis_kopynets.pdf (in Ukrainian).
- Koziej, S. (Red.). (2013). *Biała Księga Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego*. Warszawa. https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dokumenty/Biala_Ksiega_inter_mm.pdf (in Polish).
- Kyrychenko, O. (2020). Podiia lypnia 2020 roku. Wybory prezydenta Polshchi. <https://ivinas.gov.ua/publikatsiji-l/ohliad-naivazhlyvishykh-podii-svitu/podiia-lypnia-2020-roku-vybory-prezydenta-polshchi.html> (in Ukrainian).
- Lytvyn, M. (Red.). (2017). *Ukrainsko-polski vidnosyny. Novitnia doba*. Lviv: Instytut ukrainoznavstva im. I. Krypiakevycha NAN Ukrainy (in Ukrainian).
- Lytvyn, M. (Ed.). (2021). *Za svobodu: ukrainsko-polskyi dialog ta sproby porozuminnia*. Lviv: Instytut ukrainoznavstva im. I. Krypiakevycha NAN Ukrainy (in Ukrainian).
- Lytvyn, M. (Ed.). (2024). *Ukrainski markery istorii Polshchi: transformatsii druhoi polovyny XX – pochatku XXI stolittia*. Lviv; Sumy: Universytetska knyha.
- Ostapets, Yu. & Cherveniak, K. (2023). *Parlamentski vybory 2023 roku v krainakh Yevropeiskoho Soiuzu: analiz rezultativ ta konfigurasii uriadovykh koalitsii*. In A. Romaniuk & V. Lytvyn (Eds.). *Politychni partii i vybory: ukrainski ta svitovi praktyky: zb. st. i tez za rezultatamy Mizhnarodnoi naukovoï konferentsii «Instytutsiini, partiini ta vyborchi chynnyky politychnoho protsesu v Ukraini y inshykh krainakh Yevropy v umovakh viiny i nevyznachenosti: natsionalnyi, nadnatsionalnyi i subnatsionalnyi rivni» – vosmoi u ramkakh serii mizhnarodnykh konferentsii kafedry politolohii «Politychni partii i vybory: ukrainski ta svitovi praktyky» (pamiaty Yuriia Romanovycha Shvedy) vid 24–25 lystopada 2023 roku*. Lviv: LNU im. Ivana Franka, 8, 13–42. <https://dspace.uzhnu.edu.ua/jspui/handle/lib/63949> (in Ukrainian).
- Panchenko, Yu. (2017). «Dobra zmina» z liudskym oblychchiam: shcho vidomo pro maibutnoho premiera. *Yevropeiska pravda*. <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2017/12/8/7074801/> (in Ukrainian).
- Postulaty Prawa i Sprawiedliwości. Analizujemy program oraz działania partii rządzącej. (2017). <https://ideologia.pl/program-partii-prawo-i-sprawiedliwosc/> (in Polish).
- Prezydentski wybory u Polshchi: shcho zminytsia dla Ukrainy? (2015). <https://www.slovoidilo.ua/2015/05/12/stattja/polityka/prezydentski-vybory-u-polshhi-shho-zminytsya-dlya-ukrayiny> (in Ukrainian).
- Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości. (2014). <https://oko.press/images/2017/10/PiS-program-2014.pdf> (in Polish).
- Romaniuk, A. & Lytvyn, V. (2016). *Porivnialnyi analiz politychnykh instytutiv krain Vyshehradskoi hrupy ta inshykh krain Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy*. Lviv: LNU imeni Ivana Franka (in Ukrainian).

Szeptycki, A. (2023). *Współczesne stosunki polsko-ukraińskie*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar (in Polish).

Tyrała, M. (2016). Postulaty programowe a sukces wyborczy na przykładzie partii PiS i Razem w wyborach parlamentarnych w Polsce w 2015 roku. *e-Politikon. Kwartalnik naukowy Ośrodka Analiz Politologicznych Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego*, XVII, 146–168. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Marek-Tyrała/publication/324748389_Postulaty_programowe_a_sukces_wyborczy_na_przykladzie_partii_PiS_i_Razem_w_wyborach_parlamentarnych_w_Polsce_w_2015_roku_W_Red_E_Marciniak_O_Annusewicz_T_Godlewski_Zrodla_zmiany_wybory_parlamentarne_/links/5dc216d5299b1a47b1900ec/Postulaty-programowe-a-sukces-wyborczy-na-przykladzie-partii-PiS-i-Razem-w-wyborach-parlamentarnych-w-Polsce-w-2015-roku-W-Red-E-Marciniak-O-Annusewicz-T-Godlewski-Zrodla-zmiany-wybory-parlamentarna.pdf#page=147 (in Polish).

Любомир ХАХУЛА

кандидат історичних наук, старший дослідник,
доцент кафедри міжнародної інформації
Національного університету «Львівська політехніка»
ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9954-9962>
e-mail: l.khakhula@gmail.com

Юрій МАРКЕВИЧ

бакалавр міжнародних відносин
здобувач II (магістерського) рівня
кафебри міжнародної інформації
Національного університету «Львівська політехніка»
ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0009-0005-0183-5522>
e-mail: yurii.markevych.mnmim.2023@lpnu.ua

КОНСЕРВАТИЗМ ЯК СТРАТЕГІЯ НАЦІОНАЛЬНОЇ БЕЗПЕКИ: ПОЛІТИЧНІ ПРОЦЕСИ В РЕСПУБЛІЦІ ПОЛЬЩА У 2015–2023 РОКАХ

У статті проаналізовано політичні процеси у Республіці Польща в період правління партії «Право і справедливість» (PiS) у 2015–2023 роках, коли консерватизм став основою стратегії національної безпеки держави. Розглянуто консервативний поворот польської політичної сцени після т. зв. «Ери Туска» та підходи до реалізації правоконсервативних засад у внутрішній і зовнішній політиці. Детально проаналізовано електоральні перемоги PiS у 2015 та 2019 роках, що забезпечили партії парламентську більшість та президентську владу. Особливу увагу приділено п'яти основним постулатам партійної програми: відновлення держави, економічний розвиток, сімейна політика, суспільні реформи та зовнішньополітична суб'єктність. Показано, що консервативна ідеологія PiS базувалася на цінностях свободи, солідарності, справедливості, національної ідентичності та католицьких принципах.

Ключовими аспектами політичної програми були: активна соціальна програма «500+», зміцнення традиційної моделі сім'ї, посилення ролі католицької церкви, реформи судової системи та державного управління. Зовнішньополітичний курс PiS характеризувався євроскептицизмом, зміцненням співпраці зі США та НАТО, антиросійською позицією та складними відносинами з Україною. Консерватизм у

Польщі 2015–2023 років функціонував як комплексна стратегія національної безпеки, що включала захист культурної автентичності, протидію зовнішнім впливам та зміцнення внутрішньої єдності. Водночас існували суперечності між консервативними принципами та європейською інтеграцією, що призводило до зовнішніх та внутрішніх політичних конфліктів. Перехід виконавчої влади до Громадянської коаліції та формування уряду Дональда Туска у 2023 р. не поклало кінець консервативному циклу в польській політиці, а започаткувало новий процес політичного протиборства ліберально-демократичної та консервативно-демократичної доктрин. Польський досвід має велике значення для розуміння сучасних тенденцій у європейській політиці та центральноєвропейському консерватизмі.

Ключові слова: Республіка Польща, консерватизм, національна безпека, «Право і справедливість», Громадянська платформа, міжнародні відносини, політичні процеси, євроскептицизм, українсько-польські відносини.

Дата надходження статті: 31.07.2025

Дата прийняття статті: 20.08.2025

Опубліковано: 12.11.2025